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Abstract 
Two studies examine age differences in autobiographical reasoning within 
narratives about personal experiences. In Study 1 (n  = 63), people completed brief 
interviews about turning points and crises in their lives. Older participants were more 
likely to narrate crises in ways that connected the experience to the speaker’s sense of 
self, that is, to show autobiographical reasoning. This increase was primarily evident in 
young adulthood and midlife. In Study 2 (n = 115), adults provided written narratives 
about heterogeneous autobiographical experiences. Age was associated with linear 
increases in the likelihood of autobiographical reasoning. The results are discussed in 
terms of narrative approaches to self-development across the lifespan.  
 Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    3 
 
Adult Age Differences in Autobiographical Narratives: Connecting Experiences with the 
Self 
  How do we maintain a sense of unity and coherence in our sense of ourselves? 
For many self researchers working with more traditional measures of self-concept, the 
issue has been one of unity across different, equivalently abstract self-conceptions 
separated by domain or relationship (Campbell et al., 1996; Donahue, 1994; Harter & 
Monsour, 1992; Higgins, 1996; Markus & Wurf, 1987). In the present manuscript, we 
address an alternative aspect of unity and coherence – one that resonates with long-
standing philosophical concerns with identity (Locke, 1690). Specifically, we explore 
how people construct a sense of unity across their lives by creating connections between 
their experiences and self-views. In doing so, we take a narrative approach to self-
development.  
Self, the Life Story, and Autobiographical Reasoning 
The self is traditionally conceptualized as a knowledge structure involving beliefs 
and evaluations about one’s characteristics, roles, and capabilities, both current and 
possible (Harter, 1998; Higgins, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1987). Such conceptualizations 
regard the self as distinct from autobiographical memory in general, although they 
acknowledge relationships among memory and self (see also Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; McAdams, 1996). These views tend to focus on how people may integrate varied 
aspects of themselves, across different domains (e.g., work, family), different 
relationships (e.g., spouse, child), or across actual and possible selves. The emphasis of 
such approaches is twofold. First, researchers explore how individuals integrate currently Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    4 
evident discrepancies, for example, by identifying higher-order abstractions that can 
explain differences in the self in different contexts (Harter & Monsour, 1992). Second, 
people may set goals that, if attained, will bring their actual self more in line with their 
desired possible selves (e.g. Markus & Nurius, 1987).  
In contrast, our approach is grounded in life story and narrative approaches to the 
study of self (Erikson & Erikson, 1997; Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 1993). 
Such approaches emphasize that the development of the self consists of the integration of 
autobiographical experiences into a coherent life story.  The life story is defined as a 
selective set of autobiographical experiences that, together with interpretations of those 
events, explain how a person came to be who they are, and projects a sense of purpose 
and meaning into the future. Within their life stories, people articulate how they have 
changed and stayed the same across major life events (McAdams, 1996). The life story 
serves to create unity across time and experiences, thus enabling a sense of personal 
continuity across time. That kind of continuity has long been viewed as a major issue, 
both from philosophical views (Locke, 1690), and from the views of modern cognitive 
scientists (Neisser, 1988). It is, however, distinct from the type of unity emphasized in 
traditional approaches, although one can draw links between this temporal continuity and 
relations between actual and possible selves. 
From a life story perspective, the process of creating such unity requires that 
people engage in what Bluck and Habermas (Bluck & Habermas, 2000; Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000) have termed autobiographical reasoning, or the ability to link the self to 
experiences. Much of this work has focused on how people’s narratives about their actual 
and their once-possible lives construct changes. However, McAdams (McAdams, 1993) Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    5 
and others (Pals, in press; Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, under review; Pasupathi & 
Rich, in press) note that autobiographical reasoning also can construct and highlight ways 
that one stays similar across time. Regardless of whether similarity or change is 
constructed in remembering, both types of construction achieve a sense of continuity in 
the self, or, in Locke’s terms, a sense of personal identity. In the present studies, we 
focused on lifespan developmental change in autobiographical reasoning reflected in the 
construction of narratives about personal experiences.  
Varieties of Autobiographical Reasoning. People can draw connections between 
experiences and self in narratives in many ways; and researchers have explored many 
more specific types of autobiographical reasoning. One prominent approach has been to 
examine lessons and insights (Blagov & Singer, 2004; McLean & Thorne, 2004, in press; 
Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence, 2004). Lessons are defined as something people have 
learned from an experience that narrowly generalizes to similar future experiences, such 
as “I learned it’s probably not a good idea to spit at people from bridge-tops.” Insights are 
broader inferences that link an event to insights about oneself or one’s relationships with 
others.  
Others have explored ways that people find benefits and opportunities to grow 
from difficult personal experiences (Bauer & Bonanno, 2001; Bauer & McAdams, 2005; 
Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; King & Patterson, 2000; King & Raspin, 
2004; King & Smith, in press; Pals, in press, under review). Such approaches may be 
thought of as looking at more particular types of insights than the overarching concept 
noted above. These researchers have explored features of narratives such as self-
transformation (Pals, in press, under review), accommodative change (King & Patterson, Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    6 
2000), integrative themes (Bauer & McAdams, 2005), life themes (Bluck & Glueck, 
2004), the linking of ongoing activities to beliefs about the self (Bauer & Bonanno, 
2001), and biographical coherence markers or self-event connections (Habermas & Paha, 
2001; Pasupathi et al., under review). The latter are defined as statements within a 
narrative that draw some type of connection between the event narrated, and the person’s 
beliefs about him or herself in terms of traits, characteristics, and preferences. Note that 
these elements of narrative are not the same as other aspects of narrative coherence such 
as whether a story is sufficiently elaborated and internally consistent; they refer 
specifically to coherence between the narrative and an external construct – the self-
concept or the life story of the individual. 
In the present study, we focus on self-event connections as an important type of 
autobiographical reasoning for the integration of self across experiences and time. That 
is, because self-event connections make explicit links between the events of one’s life, 
and the development of one’s characteristics and capabilities, they are a type of 
autobiographical reasoning that is fundamental to resolving the problem of unity in one’s 
self across time. 
Development of Autobiographical Reasoning across the Lifespan: Childhood to 
Adolescence 
For a person to engage in autobiographical reasoning when constructing a 
personal narrative, at least two prerequisites apply. First, the person must be able to tell 
the story of an event. Second, the individual must have some sense of self, whether one 
defines that in terms of knowledge structures, or in terms of a rudimentary or emerging Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    7 
life story. Taken together, these two requirements suggest that we will not see abundant 
autobiographical reasoning in personal narratives until adolescence, as is the case.   
The ability to construct simple stories about single episodes emerges between 18 
months and 3 years, roughly (Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1989; Harley & Reese, 1999; 
Howe & Courage, 1993; Nelson, 1991l; Reese & Brown, 2000), although children 
increase the sophistication and elaboration of their stories across time. Basic knowledge 
about the self begins to develop very early in life (Rochat, 2001), and by middle 
childhood, most children have at least some sense of self in knowledge-structure terms 
(Harter, 1998; Marsh, Parada, & Ayotte, 2004).  
The life story, on the other hand, is believed to emerge only during adolescence 
and early adulthood (Habermas & Bluck, 2000). The late emergence of the life story is 
attributable to its dependence on the development of other capacities during adolescence 
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Habermas & Paha, 2001; Thorne, 2000). For example, in 
work explicitly focusing on self-event connections, middle and older adolescents, but not 
early adolescents, are able to narrate experiences in ways that reflect how the self caused 
that experience to occur, or how the experience may have changed the self (Habermas & 
Paha, 2001). Interestingly, both middle and older adolescents articulated how their own 
characteristics caused experiences to occur, but only older adolescents drew links 
between the events of their lives, and how those events had changed their characteristics. 
Development of Autobiographical Reasoning: Adolescence and Beyond 
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to expect development in 
autobiographical reasoning beyond adolescence. Theoretical approaches emphasize 
motivational changes across adulthood that may influence the way people construct Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    8 
narratives about personal experience. For example, Eriksonian and related views of adult 
development have emphasized the importance of reviewing one’s life in late adulthood, 
in order to come to terms with the life that was lived, rather than the life that might have 
been (Butler, 1963; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). Empirically, the process of life review is 
most adaptive when it includes qualities that integrate autobiographical recollections with 
the rememberer’s identity (Wong & Watt, 1991).  
Carstensen (Carstensen, 1993) proposed in her theory of socioemotional 
selectivity that late life renders endings highly salient, and that this results in an increased 
importance for meaningful emotional experience. Empirically, the importance of 
meaningful emotional experience is reflected in different preferences for social partners 
(Carstensen, 1992; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999; Fung, Lai, & Ngu, ; Lang & 
Carstensen, 2002), as well as in changes in emotional experience and emotion regulation 
(Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Gross et al., 1997). It is also, 
importantly, reflected in changes in the emotional experience of autobiographical 
remembering (Pasupathi & Carstensen, 2003). Speculatively, connecting experiences 
with one’s sense of self during remembering could render those experiences more 
meaningful and positive, though this has not been tested.  
Direct tests of adult age differences in autobiographical reasoning are evident 
from two studies. Bauer and McAdams (2005), in a fairly small sample of adults ranging 
from 30 to 72, that older adults are more likely to narrate important and transitional life 
experiences with themes of growth and integration. They did not code for self-event 
connections specifically, but the types of statements that they would have viewed as 
reflecting growth through integration overlap substantially with our notion of self-event Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    9 
connections. For example, integration themes were reflected in statements that connected 
experiences with the person’s self-views. A second study done by Bluck and Glueck 
(Bluck & Glueck, 2004), compared adolescent (aged 15-20), younger adult (aged 30-40 
years), and older adult (aged 60 and over) narratives about times when they felt they had 
demonstrated wisdom. Younger and older adults, in comparison to adolescents, were 
especially likely to narrate experiences of wisdom in ways that connected the experience 
to their own larger life themes or philosophies, again, one type of autobiographical 
reasoning. The two adult groups did not differ significantly from one another. Thus, one 
of these studies suggests continued adult age change in the likelihood of displaying 
autobiographical reasoning, while the other suggests change across early- to middle-
adulthood, followed by stability.  
Two other sets of empirical findings indirectly suggest adult age differences in 
autobiographical reasoning. First, some findings suggest that older adults show selected 
improvements in storytelling ability (James, Burke, Austin, & Hulme, 1998; Kemper, 
Kynette, Rash, O' Brien, & Sprott, 1989; Kemper, Rash, Kynette, & Norman, 1990; 
Mergler & Goldstein, 1983; Pratt & Robins, 1991), by employing a more subjective, 
interpretive way of storytelling (Adams, 1991; Gould & Dixon, 1993; Pratt & Robins, 
1991). Autobiographical reasoning is one subset of interpretive story content. The 
reasons for changes in storytelling ability are not clear, and may involve motivation (e.g., 
Adams, Smith, Pasupathi, & Vittolo, 2002), increased skill (Mergler & Goldstein, 1983), 
or actually be linked to decline in surprising ways (James et al., 1998).  
In addition to storytelling changes, researchers working within traditional 
approaches to self-development have shown curvilinear changes in the complexity of Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    10 
self-conceptions across adulthood, with middle-aged adults showing the most complex, 
individuated, and integrated self-conceptions (Diehl, Hastings, & Stanton, 2001; 
Labouvie-Vief, Chiodo, Goguen, Diehl, & Orwoll, 1995). Development of the self in this 
work is viewed as resulting from age-related increases in the ability to integrate 
emotional and cognitive aspects of experience, but also from age-related declines in fluid 
intellectual abilities in later adulthood. The same two factors might result in similar 
patterns of age differences in autobiographical reasoning across adulthood.  
Summary and Overview of the Present Studies 
The major goal of the present studies was to document a developmental 
phenomenon for which prior findings had been somewhat equivocal. We hoped to 
document this phenomenon with a broader and more continuous age-sample than in 
previous studies, and across different types of events and modalities of narration than had 
previously been explored. Based on the findings reviewed above, we hypothesized age 
differences across adulthood in the extent to which people’s autobiographical narratives 
exhibited autobiographical reasoning. We focused on the presence of explicit self-event 
connections in participants’ narratives as indicators of autobiographical reasoning. We 
examined both linear and curvilinear patterns of age differences, as Bluck and Glueck 
found curvilinear change, and Bauer and McAdams linear change. In the first study, we 
focus on major life events, narrated in an interview context. In the second, we focus on a 
wide-ranging sample of heterogeneous memories elicited via written narratives. Both 
studies support the existence of age differences in autobiographical reasoning across 
adulthood.   
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  Study 1 examined memories of significant events and periods in life, elicited in an 
interview context. Many narrative researchers believe it is more important to integrate 
these types of events with the self than more mundane and everyday events (McAdams, 
Hoffman, Mansfield, & Day, 1996; Pals, 1999; Singer & Salovey, 1993). We chose two 
types of significant events which we believed to differ in the ease with which they could 
be integrated with the self: turning points, and crises. Turning points are by definition 
part of the life story - that is, they form part of people’s autobiographical understanding 
of how they have become the person they currently are. Crises are events that rattle our 
views of ourselves and the world, thus presenting greater challenges for linking those 
experiences to our beliefs about ourselves. We wanted to explore whether older adults 
were more likely to integrate experiences with the self across different types of 
experiences, or whether age differences were more localized within one of these types of 
events. 
Study 1 Methods 
Participants 
  Participants in this study were drawn from a larger study of emotion and aging 
(Carstensen et al., 2000). The larger study included 184 participants recruited by a survey 
research company, with equal numbers of males and females ranging across the entire 
adult lifespan. Sampling was restricted to African-Americans and European-Americans, 
and designed to over-represent African-Americans at about 1/3 of the total sample. In 
addition, sampling was restricted so that the entire age range would be equally 
represented. Participants were telephoned by the survey company, and if they agreed to Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    12 
participate, were scheduled for an initial session either at the survey company’s offices, 
or at Stanford University.  
From this larger sample, we randomly assigned 63 participants to complete a brief 
interview about turning points and crises in the initial session of the study. The remaining 
participants completed other tasks during that time. The subsample used in the present 
study ranged in age from 18 to 86, M(SD) = 55.4(23.1); approximately 52% of the 
sample was under age 65, and the remainder were older than 65. Approximately half 
(n=30) were male, and two-thirds (n=42) were European-American, and the remaining 20 
participants were African-American. According to the survey company’s classification, 
53% were white-collar, and the remainder blue-collar, and they reported an average of 
14.5 years of education (SD = 2.7). These participants who completed the turning points 
and crises interview did not differ significantly from the overall sample in age, gender, or 
ethnicity. One participant was missing a turning-points interview due to an audiotaping 
failure.  
Procedure 
  The larger study focused on experience sampling, and involved a 2 hour initial 
session in which participants learned how to operate the pagers that were part of the 
larger project, completed measures of personality, basic demographics, cognitive 
functioning, and social support networks
1. In that initial session, participants randomly 
drawn for the present study completed a brief interview. The interview took place after 
the participants had spent substantial time with the experimenter, and consisted of two 
segments: a turning points segment, and a crisis segment. The order of the segments was 
counterbalanced and did not influence the results reported below. Interviewers were all Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    13 
college-aged women, who went through a standardized training procedure that included 
videotaped interviews and feedback. The prompts used were non-verbal encouragers such 
as “mm-mmm” and “uh-huh” and (for cases where participants paused) “is there anything 
more you can tell me?” We did not standardize prompts beyond providing these prompts 
on the interviewer’s script. Neither the particular interviewer, nor the number of prompts 
given, were related to the findings reported here.  
For turning points, participants were asked first to think about and list turning 
points in their lives. Participants were then asked to select one turning point and talk 
about it in more detail: “Can you tell me everything about this particular turning point?” 
For crises, participants were asked if they had ever experienced something like a crisis, 
“or a time when you doubted yourself” and again, were asked to select one such crisis to 
discuss in more detail. Aside from the initial request to talk about a selected turning 
point/crisis, interviewers were instructed to provide non-specific prompts and 
backchannels, until the participant indicated there was nothing more to say. At the end of 
each segment, participants were asked to talk more explicitly about their emotions at the 
time. Each participant generated two interview narratives, one regarding a turning point, 
and one regarding a crisis. A wide range of experiences were nominated, from deaths, 
divorces, and abuse experiences, to dilemmas about applying to medical school and the 
rewards of pursuing one’s own business.  
Following the interview and the end of the first session, participants provided one 
week of experience-sampling data, and returned for a debriefing session. Participants 
were compensated $100.00 for participation in the entire protocol. The present study 
focused only on the interview data and demographics data gathered in session one.  Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    14 
Measures 
  Narrative Coding for Autobiographical Reasoning. Autobiographical reasoning is 
defined as the construction of connections that link experiences to the person’s sense of 
self, broadly defined. Our initial coding scheme (Pasupathi et al., under review) involved 
five possible types of connections: (1) the event is explained by or illustrates a pre-
existing quality of the self; (2) the event appears to indicate some new quality, but should 
be dismissed or ignored; (3) the event caused a change in my self-views; (4) the event 
revealed a pre-existing, but previously unrecognized quality of myself; and (5) no 
connection to self. Each narrative was coded as belonging to one and only one category 
and coders relied on the presence of very explicit statements by the participant. This 
coding scheme is primarily independent of other aspects of narrative such as coherence 
and elaboration. Note that a narrative could vary considerably in terms of narrative 
coherence, but still contain self-event connections. Moreover, narratives could be 
impoverished in detail but still contain self-event connections, and vice versa. This is 
important, because we were focused here on the issue of integration of self and 
experience, as assessed within narratives; but we were not focused on capturing the 
relative coherence or elaboration of the narratives themselves.  
Because some of our more categories (dismiss and reveal) were extremely 
infrequent in the interviews, we collapsed these five codes into three: no connection to 
the self, a stability-relation (which included the explain/illustrate category and the 
extremely infrequent dismiss category), and a change-relation (which included both cause 
and reveal relations). Our rationale for this was fairly straightforward: Dismissals 
explicitly take up the issue of a self-event connection and deny that one exists, thus Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    15 
maintaining a stable sense of self. Reveal connections also explicitly note change in the 
self-view, but view that change as being due to the event causing a shift in perspective on 
the self. The second author served as the primary coder and provided the codes used in 
analyses reported below; the first author served as the reliability coder for Study 1.  
During coding, the second author was blind to the primary hypotheses of the study, and 
had no access to data on participants’ ages or other characteristics. Reliabilities for 30 
stories (25% of the total sample) across the three collapsed codes was good, with coders 
agreeing 83 percent of the time, ￿ = .74, t = 5.6, p < .01. Examples of the three 
categories are provided in Table 1; the relevant text that led to the coding decision is 
underlined.  
Validity. This is a novel way to assess autobiographical reasoning and may be 
understood as an expansion of initial work by Habermas and Paha (2001). In their 
approach, they collected life story narratives from a small sample of adolescents, and 
identified the number of self-event connections in which the self caused an experience, 
and in which the experience changed the self. Their work suggests that these types of 
connections are quite rare, and increase with age during adolescence, providing some 
preliminary validity of the developmental changes expected in this measure. A further 
validity issue is the extent to which our coding scheme captured the way participants 
themselves think about the experience when prompted. Elsewhere, we have collected 
validity data on the coding scheme by comparing our coding of written narratives and 
participants probed responses elicited after they produced their written narrative 
(Pasupathi & Mansour, unpublished data). Autobiographical reasoning indicators coded 
from participants’ unprompted narratives are typically consistent with what participants Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    16 
say when asked explicitly to create such connections. Across 96 responses, participants’ 
responses to direct autobiographical reasoning probes seldom conflicted with our coding 
of their initial narrative (for stability connections, only 6 of 96 participants, and for 
change connections, only 9 of 96 participants reported probed responses that conflicted 
with their narratives).  
For our analyses, both change and stability connections reflected the presence of 
explicit autobiographical reasoning. So, for our primary analyses, we collapsed across 
stability and change connections and contrasted narratives involving either type of 
connection, with narratives involving no connection. 
Study 1 Results & Discussion 
  We first examined whether gender or ethnicity were related to the likelihood of 
self-event connections either independently or in interaction with age. They were not, and 
these factors are not considered further. Overall, 62% of turning points and 70% of crises 
were narrated with no self-event connections, and this is typical of work with narratives 
(McLean & Thorne, 2004; Thorne et al., 2004). Looking only at those participants who 
did express self-event connections, such connections were descriptively more prevalent 
for turning points (n = 32) than for crises (n = 20). Across both types of events, self-event 
connections in which the event changed the self were more prevalent than those which 
invoked stability: for turning points, 22% (n = 7 of 32) employed stability-promoting 
connections, and for crises, 40% did so (n = 8 of 20).   
Are Older Adults’ Narratives More Likely to Involve Self-Event Connections? 
  To explore whether age was significantly associated with whether or not 
participants included any self-event connections in their narratives, we computed two Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    17 
logistic regressions, one for turning points, and one for crises. In each case, we included 
both linear and quadratic effects of age in the model.  For turning points, age had no 
impact on the likelihood of self-event connections, with the overall model ￿2(2) = 1.7, p 
> .40 and the linear and quadratic age factors failing to attain statistical significance.   
For crises, in contrast, age was significantly related to self-event connections, 
￿2(2) = 6.2, p < .05, and the nature of this relationship was non-linear. The linear effect 
of age was positive, suggesting that with increasing participant age, self-event 
connections were more likely, B = .21, Wald’s ￿2 = 4.7, p = .03. The quadratic effect of 
age was negative, B = -.002, Wald’s ￿2 = 4.4, p < .04. In order to better illustrate the data, 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of people in each age group whose crisis narrative 
contained a self-event connection. Examination of Figure 1 suggests that one way to 
interpret these findings is that age is related to increases in the likelihood of self-event 
connections in narratives through middle age, but this increase then levels off, such that 
the primary arena for change occurs between young adulthood and middle age (the peak 
of the curve occurs between the ages of 50 and 70 years). In order to descriptively 
illustrate the findings, we computed correlations between age and self-event connections 
separately for participants under 60 (n = 32) and over 60 (n = 31) years of age. For those 
under 60, this correlation was significant and positive, r = .38, p < .05. For those over 60, 
this correlation was negative, but smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant, r 
= -.12, p > .50. The same pattern is evident when other cut-points, such as 50 or 70, are 
employed. The correlational results cannot be taken as equivalent to post-hoc tests, but do 
suggest that the quadratic pattern observed may be asymptotic rather than an inverted U.  Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    18 
These results suggest that there are changes across adulthood in the likelihood of 
explicit autobiographical reasoning, differences that are primarily evident in crises, rather 
than in turning points. They further suggest that this pattern is curvilinear in nature, with 
increases in the likelihood of such reasoning from young adulthood into middle 
adulthood, followed either by a leveling off of those increases, or by the beginnings of 
declines. Finally, this pattern was consistent across males and females, and across two 
different ethnic groups.  
Study 2: Heterogeneous Events and Written Narratives 
The major purpose of Study 2 was to replicate and extend findings from Study 1 
with a more heterogeneous set of events, and a different remembering modality - writing. 
These changes address two limitations of the data employed in Study 1. First, more 
heterogeneous events allowed for greater variability in the self-implications of the 
recalled experiences than was the case in Study 1, which limited the selection of events to 
those that clearly had self-relevant implications. The extension to a written mode of recall 
addresses the possibility that interviewers in Study 1, all of whom were young adult 
college students, responded differently to older adults than younger adults, thus eliciting 
different content, or that older adults responded differently to the intergenerational task of 
talking to our younger adult interviewers than did younger adults participants.  
In Study 2 we also obtained additional information about the events narrated, 
including their importance and emotionality. This information is important in exploring 
whether adults of different ages were actually recalling events that contained more or less 
potential for self-event connections. That is, it is possible that the age-related differences 
we observed in Study 1 were due to the types of events people select to recall. Finally, we Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    19 
were also able to examine alternative indicators of ‘age’, including the age of the event, 
and the age of the individual at encoding, versus their age at retrieval (i.e., during 
participation). Events that have been retained for a longer period of time are more likely 
to be ‘self-defining’, and thus to be narrated with explicit autobiographical reasoning. 
Earlier work has shown that age-at-encoding also influences the way people construct 
narratives of autobiographical experiences (Conway & Holmes, 2004; Thorne, 1995).  
Study 2 Methods 
Participants 
  Participants were 115 volunteers (42 male and 70 female, 3 additional participants 
did not report their gender), recruited from the Salt Lake Valley metropolitan area to 
participate in a study of memory telling (Pasupathi, 2003)
2. Recruitment was done via 
flyers and newspaper advertisements, and participants were compensated 10-15$ for 
participation, depending on how long it took them to complete the questionnaires 
(between one and one-and-one-half hours for most participants). The participants ranged 
in age from 18 to 89, M(SD) = 43(19), with  approximately 87% of the sample under age 
65, and 72% under age 50. Participants reported an average of 14.4 years of education 
(SD = 2.9). The sample was overwhelmingly European-American (81%), consistent with 
the general population of Utah, precluding any examination of ethnicity.  
Procedure 
  Participation took place individually in our laboratory, or in small group settings 
in residential communities. Participants completed a lengthy questionnaire focused on 
experiences that they had talked about with other individuals. The questionnaire initially 
asked participants to think of an experience, and to “describe the experience” in writing. Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    20 
Experiences ranged widely, from returning items to a store to a disclosure of childhood 
sexual abuse. Participants were then asked to report when the event occurred, and to rate, 
using 7-point Likert-type scales, how important the event was, the emotions they felt 
when the event occurred, and how much it revealed something about who they are. 
Participants were also asked questions about the disclosure of the event, and how 
listeners responded to the disclosure. This data is not employed for the present study and 
is not discussed further.
3  
Measures 
  Narrative Coding of Autobiographical Reasoning was done as in Study 1. Initial 
coding was done with the five-category system, and collapsed to three categories 
examined in Study 1. Coding was done by the second author, who was blind to age and to 
the primary hypothesis while scoring protocols. An undergraduate research assistant was 
trained to apply the coding system based on a manual and a subset of the data. This 
assistant then independently coded 20 narratives (18% of the data) to establish reliability. 
Reliability was good, 95% agreement, ￿ = .85, t = 5.8, p < .01.  
  Event Characteristics. Participants rated on a single Likert-type scale the 
importance of the event (1 = not important, 7 = very important), and the extent to which 
the event revealed something about who they are (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Participants also rated the emotions elicited by the event initially across eight positive 
(happiness, joy, contentment, excitement, pride, accomplishment, interest, and 
amusement) emotions, using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = the most ever). We 
averaged across the eight terms to create an index of initial positive emotions elicited by 
the event (a = .92). Participants reported how long ago the event occurred, and from this Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    21 
report we computed the age of the event in years, as well as the age of the individual 
when the event occurred. 
Study 2 Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
  The events narrated by participants were on average fairly important, M(SD) = 
5.9(1.6), and self-revealing, M(SD) = 5.6(1.8), but not especially emotionally positive, 
M(SD) = 3.4(1.9).  Participants reported that events had occurred an average of 7 years 
ago, SD = 15, with a range from the same day as the study to 65 years earlier.  
About 76% of the narratives were coded as having no self-event connections, and of 
those coded as having connections (n = 28), 39% were stability connections and 61% 
were change connections.   
Were event characteristics associated with the presence of autobiographical 
reasoning? Because the different event characteristics above were inter-correlated (0 < 
r’s < .41), we examined whether the presence or absence of self-event connections was 
associated with any of those features using a multivariate analysis of variance with 
importance, self-revealingness, emotional positivity, and age of the events as dependent 
variables, and the presence/absence of self-event connections as the independent variable. 
The results revealed an overall main effect of self-event connections, F(4,103) = 2.5, p < 
.05, ￿2 = .09. Inspection of the univariate F-values suggested this main effect was 
primarily due to relations between the presence of self-event connections and ratings of 
the extent to which the event was self-revealing, F(1,106) = 9.4, p < .01, ￿2 = .08. 
Events narrated with self-event connections were rated as more self-revealing, M(SD) = Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    22 
6.4(1.3) than were events narrated with no such connections, M(SD) = 5.3(1.9). This 
finding lends further support to the validity of our coding scheme.  
  Was age related to any of the event characteristics? We computed Pearson 
correlations between age of participant and the importance, self-revealingness, insight-
provoking quality, and age of the events they recalled. Not surprisingly, older adults were 
providing memories of older events, r = .37, p < .01, but did not view their events as 
more self-revealing, r = -.02, emotionally positive, r = .08, or important, r = .11, p > .20. 
This suggests that any age effects on the prevalence of self-event connections could be 
attributable to the age of the event, but were not likely to be attributable to age 
differences in the types of events selected for reporting in this study. As in Study 1, we 
also examined whether gender had main effects or interacted with age in predicting self-
event connections. This was not the case, and gender was excluded from the analyses 
reported below.  
Are Older Adults More Likely to Integrate Events with the Self than Younger Adults? 
We conducted a logistic regression predicting whether or not participants’ 
narratives involved self-event connections, based on participant age, and the extent to 
which the event was self-revealing. The regression was conducted in a hierarchical, 
stepwise fashion, with self-revealingness and age of event entered on a first block, the 
linear effect of participant age on a second block, and the quadratic effect of age on a 
third block
4. The second model, including all three predictors, significantly predicted the 
presence of self-event connections, ￿2(3) = 18.0, p < .01. The extent to which the event 
was perceived as self-revealing significantly predicted autobiographical reasoning, 
Wald’s ￿2(1) = 7.3, p < .01, B = .55, as did the participant’s age, Wald’s ￿2(1) = 7.2, p < Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    23 
.01, B = .04. Results from the third model, in which a quadratic effect of age was added, 
suggested that there was no quadratic effect of age, ￿2(1)Step < 1. The age effect is shown 
in Figure 2, again, in terms of the number of individuals at each age whose narratives 
displayed self-integration. As presented there, age was associated with an increasing 
frequency autobiographical reasoning. This replicates the linear age effect observed in 
Study 1 with a more heterogeneous set of experiences, and when controlling for an 
important potential differences in the types of events people of different ages might be 
remembering. We did not replicate the quadratic effect of age, and it is likely that this is 
due to the fact that in this study, we had fewer participants over the age of 65 years. 
Notably, Bauer and McAdams (2005) had relatively fewer very old participants (none 
over 72 years of age), and also did not find a quadratic effect of age.  
Is this effect due to age at retrieval or age at encoding? Both age of the 
rememberer, r = .20, p < .04, and age of the experiencer, r = .26, p < .01, were 
significantly and positively correlated with the likelihood of autobiographical reasoning 
in the narrative. However, in the present data, these two variables were too highly 
intercorrelated, r = .69 for statistically testing this possibility, nor are the small 
differences between these two correlations sufficiently large to be statistically reliable.  
General Discussion 
The results presented above suggest that middle-aged and older adults are more 
likely than younger adults to demonstrate explicit autobiographical reasoning when 
constructing autobiographical narratives. This age difference was present in both 
interview-elicited and written narratives, and for both significant and heterogeneous life 
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drawing self-event connections is more problematic – that is, when the events being 
narrated are heterogeneous in their potential for meaning, or in the case of crisis events 
that challenge participants’ existing self-conceptions. For turning point events, which are 
by definition already part of the individuals’ life story, we did not observe any age 
differences.  
The two studies both suggested linear age-related increases in the likelihood of 
autobiographical reasoning across young adulthood and into middle-age. In this sense, 
they are very consistent with earlier work by Bluck and Glueck (2004) and Bauer and 
McAdams (in press). Both of those studies showed adult age differences consistent with 
our findings. In Bluck and Glueck’s work, those differences could be described as 
increases between late adolescence and early middle age, followed by stability. In Bauer 
and McAdams’ findings, linear increases were observed in adults ranging from 30 to 72 
years of age. The consistency across these three studies emerges in spite of differences 
between the studies in terms of samples, narrative elicitations, and the specific types of 
autobiographical reasoning that were explored.   
The details of the pattern of age-related differences in adults over 65 are not as 
clear. In Study 1, and in Bluck and Glueck (2004), where there were a large number of 
adults over 60 in the sample, age-related differences diminished or changed direction 
later in adulthood. In Study 2, as in Bauer and McAdams (2004), with fewer adults over 
the age of 60, we found evidence for linear change. Study 2 may have yielded a 
curvilinear component given a larger sample size in the older adult range. In fact, 
computing simple correlations in the under-60 and over-60 participants in Study 2 
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small negative correlation, r = -.09, in the over-60 individuals. Neither of these 
correlations is statistically significant, but the pattern is consistent with findings from 
Study 1. Still, future work examining autobiographical reasoning will need to adequately 
sample across adulthood to better establish the full pattern of age-related differences 
suggested by current findings.  
The present data leave unanswered two important questions for future 
investigations. A first question concerns the source of age differences – that is, what are 
the developmental mechanisms that promote autobiographical reasoning? A second set of 
questions concerns the adaptiveness of such reasoning. Next, we consider some 
speculations about the origins and implications of autobiographical reasoning, as well as 
how those speculations might be examined empirically in future work.  
What Leads to More Autobiographical Reasoning with Age? 
  One possibility is that the differences observed are linked to motivational changes 
with age identified in socioemotional selectivity theory, such as an increasing emphasis 
on more meaningful experience and on emotion regulation (Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen 
et al., 2000), as well as an increasing emphasis on remembering to integrate across one’s 
life, based on developmental tasks approaches (Erikson & Erikson, 1997). One way to 
ensure meaningfulness in the context of autobiographical narration is to construct 
connections between events and one’s sense of self. Other work addressing 
socioemotional selectivity theory has employed experimental manipulations of the 
salience of endings, and questionnaire measures of perceptions of future time. Both 
approaches could conceivably be employed to examine how individual differences in 
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influence the extent to which people create self-event connections in narratives. An 
Eriksonian approach would need to develop ways to experimentally manipulate the 
salience of a task like life review (Butler, 1963) to employ similar approaches.  
A second possibility is that developmental changes in more traditional aspects of 
the self lay a different cognitive foundation for autobiographical narration – one that 
promotes autobiographical reasoning. As noted earlier, findings suggest that the most 
complex, individuated, and integrated self-conception is evident in late middle age (Diehl 
et al., 2001; Labouvie-Vief et al., 1995). This complex and unified self permits greater 
scope for integrating new experiences with the self when telling personal stories, because 
a more complex self can be more easily connected to a greater variety of personal 
experiences. These findings also suggest that any age-related changes in the likelihood of 
autobiographical reasoning in narrative may be curvilinear in nature, mirroring changes 
in the structure of self-conceptions. In future work, this possibility could be empirically 
evaluated with the inclusion of measures of self-concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996), 
self-concept complexity (Labouvie-Vief et al., 1995), or self-concept differentiation 
(Diehl et al., 2001; Donahue, 1994). A related alternative here is that linear increases in 
the prevalence of self-event connections with age are constrained by changes in basic 
cognitive functioning in very old age, resulting in the curvilinear patterns observed in 
self-descriptions and, to some extent, in indicators of autobiographical reasoning.  
Age differences in autobiographical reasoning could reflect more general changes 
in storytelling, as also noted earlier. Older adults make better storytellers from the view 
of listeners (James et al., 1998; Kemper et al., 1989; Kemper et al., 1990; Mergler & 
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such as interpretation and elaboration, more than younger adults (Adams, 1991; Gould & 
Dixon, 1993; Pratt & Robins, 1991). Because autobiographical reasoning is one aspect of 
interpretive and elaborative remembering, its presence may reflect a more general 
tendency evident in both personal and non-personal stories.  
Finally, our findings are inconclusive about the role of age-at-remembering (the 
basis for our analyses) versus age-at-encoding. That is, age differences may have 
emerged in these studies because older experiencers make sense of events differently 
when those events occur, or because older rememberers recall those events differently 
when reconstructing them from memory. In past research, there is evidence that the age 
of the individual at the time events occurred can influence how they recall the event at 
some later time (Conway & Holmes, 2004; Thorne, 1995). In Study 2, both age-at-
encoding and age-at-recall predicted increases in self-event connections, but these two 
measures were so highly inter-correlated that we could not analyze them independently. 
Future work aiming to distinguish these possibilities might explore contrasts between 
older and younger adults’ recollection of recent versus distant past experiences, in order 
to disentangle these issues. 
Is the Creation of Self-Event Connections Adaptive?  
A second issue, of course, is whether these age differences are linked to larger 
developmental gains. For the individual, integrating important life events with the self 
may be consequential for mental, and possibly even physical health, as suggested by 
work on the “Writing Cure” (Pennebaker & Keough, 1999; Smyth, 1998), and by 
research on bereavement (Bauer & Bonanno, 2001). In the latter work, widows and 
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themselves (‘being’) did better over time than those who did not make these connections. 
In this light, the age differences observed here can be viewed quite positively. Moreover, 
other researchers studying similar features of narratives, such as accommodative change 
(King & Patterson, 2000), self-transformation (Pals, in press, under review), and 
integrative themes (Bauer & McAdams, 2005), have often shown links between the 
prevalence of those elements in narratives, and well-being and maturity more 
traditionally defined (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2005; Blagov & Singer, 2004; King & 
Patterson, 2000). Importantly, Pals’ work distinguishes between positive and negative 
changes in the self as articulated in narratives, and highlights the fact that, as examined 
here, we have not addressed the valence or specific content of self-event connections. 
Linking a negative event to the self in a stable way could be destructive – undermining 
the confidence individuals need to grow. However, dismissing negative experiences 
might also deprive individuals of the possibility for change. Thus, self-event connections 
as we have examined them here leave room for more specific analyses; more specificity 
may be necessary to fully examine issues of adaptivity. 
In addition, autobiographical reasoning may be an important feature of narrative 
remembering that helps to create intimacy and connections between people. From this 
perspective, people who engage in this type of remembering in social contexts may also 
benefit in an interpersonal sense, although this is more speculative (Alea & Bluck, in 
preparation).  
Some Limitations of the Present Findings 
  Of course, the present findings have several limitations. As already noted, the age 
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connections decline in frequency in later life, or whether increases in such connections 
simply level off. Importantly, the replication of the linear effect across samples that 
differed in their representation of young and middle-adulthood is reassuring. Moreover, 
the data are cross-sectional in nature, thus, a generational differences explanation cannot 
be ruled out. This is especially important because an emphasis on integrating events into 
a coherent life story may be a cultural-historical emphasis that is less present in non-
Western cultures, and is sometimes argued to be diminishing in our own culture during 
current eras (Gergen, 1991; Lifton, 1999). Thus, it is possible that age differences really 
reflect ongoing generational shifts in the desire to integrate experiences with the self 
across the successive generations included in both studies.  
It remains a possibility that older adults and younger adults are essentially 
recalling different types of experiences, with older adults focusing on more self-relevant 
events than younger adults. This explanation, however, is made less likely based on a 
number of features of our two studies. First, in Study 1, both older and younger adults 
were recalling major, personally significant life events. Across both studies, a scan of the 
content of narratives reveals that by and large, events related by older and younger adults 
in both studies were connected to the self, regardless of whether participants explicitly 
drew such a connection in constructing the narrative. For example, in both studies, young 
adults talked about career choices, relationship events, mistakes and failures, and older 
adults spoke of retirement, losses, past successes, good and bad relationships, relational 
conflict, etc. That is, the age differences in narrative construction are difficult to explain 
via the assertion that younger adults were simply choosing to narrate events unconnected 
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Other limitations include the relatively small sample sizes, our broad categories 
for coding autobiographical reasoning, and the relatively high prevalence of no 
connection narratives. The high prevalence of no-connection narratives is consistent with 
other findings in the narrative field (see also McLean & Thorne, 2004; Pasupathi et al., 
under review; Thorne & McLean, in press). However, it raises the issue that perhaps 
storytelling is not the most important ‘path’ by which people construct their own 
development over time. One possibility is that individual differences play an important 
role in which people emphasize the construction of a narrative self and which individuals 
don’t. For example, extraversion is associated with increased frequency of narrating 
personal experiences, and increased comfort while doing so (McLean & Pasupathi, under 
review). Extraverts may, as a consequence, be more ‘story-focused’ in their self-
construction than less extraverted individuals. Other individual differences may also play 
a role, such as ego-development (King & Raspin, 2004), or differences in self-awareness 
or the tendency to seek insights from one’s experiences.   
Other explanations for no-connection narrative emphasize the discursive context. 
In the case of Study 1, that context involved explicit statements about the meaning of the 
event from the interviewer (i.e., “a crisis, or time when you doubted yourself”). Thus, for 
participants in Study 1, the meaning of the event may be excluded from the narrative 
because it has been provided by the interviewer, and is thus a ‘given’; perhaps this was 
especially true of younger adults.  However, Study 2 provided no such context, and 
yielded even higher percentages of no connection narratives. Further, age differences 
emerged regardless of the extent to which the discursive context encouraged 
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quite good at adapting to different discourse contexts if those contexts are studied ‘in 
vivo’ (Adams et al., 2002; Gould, 2004).  
Another aspect of the discourse context worth consideration, however, is the fact 
that participants’ purpose in these studies was to respond to an experimental request. In 
other work, the goal to seek meaning is particularly likely to result in phenomena like 
autobiographical reasoning (McLean & Thorne, in press; Pasupathi, under review), thus, 
situations in which experimenters request the production of a narrative may be likely to 
underestimate the extent of autobiographical reasoning in everyday life, particularly in 
contexts like those of the present study, in which the study procedures avoided pushing 
participants to seek meanings or insights. In a more traditional life story interview, the 
prompts interviewers employ emphasize meaning and insights more directly.  
  In sum, the present findings, along with those of others (Bauer & McAdams, 
2005; Bluck & Glueck, 2004) suggest that across adulthood, people become increasingly 
likely to construct personal narratives that contain autobiographical reasoning. The 
reasons behind the change and the implications for issues of adaptation remain open 
questions for future work. In this sense, narrative approaches to self-development have 
already served to open new frontiers for adult developmental research. 
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Footnotes 
1 Age was significantly associated with cognitive performance as indicated by the 
Wais digit-symbol test and a verbal fluency task (see Carstensen et al., 2000), but 
inclusion of these variables did not change any of the results reported above. 
2 The primary purpose of the original study was not to examine age differences, 
but to explore a variety of aspects of memory telling in everyday life in a heterogeneous, 
non-college student sample. Thus, the age distribution in the present study is not ideal. 
3 Pasupathi and Carstensen (2003) reported on emotion ratings as a central 
variable in a set of studies on emotional experience while engaged in memory telling. As 
reported in Pasupathi & Carstensen, 2003, participants of different ages reported events 
with similar emotional properties initially, although older adults reported more positive 
emotion during retelling. The present study is focused on something different – namely, 
the nature of participants’ memories. The memories themselves were not included in the 
previous work.  
4 We also tested for whether age interacted with self-revealingness or the age of 
the event, such that age differences were moderated by these two features of the events 
narrated. This was not the case, suggesting that age differences were independent of these 
two features of the events. 
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Table 1: Examples of No-Connection, Stable, and Change Narratives* 
No connection 
In July 1997, I took a raft trip on the middle fork of the Salmon River in Idaho.  
This was a self-guided trip without “guides”.  The trip preparation was 
uneventful, but from the time we left Boise it was anything but on the way to the 
launch site one of the vehicles. 
Stable Self Explains/is Illustrated by Event 
Late last year a close friend hosted a Christmas party at a rental in Park City. She 
knew that I was a pretty good cook and invited me to cater it.  My friend (we’ll 
call her Lois), is around my mothers age, so I didn’t really expect to be invited at 
all.  Therefore, I was flattered when she included me, if only as the help.  Lois 
provided some of the recipes and asked me to come up with some of my own.  
She gave me the credit card and sent me to the market for the ingredients.  Eight 
hours later the guests began arriving just as I dished up the last menu item.  
Things went even better than expected.   
Event Changes Self 
I’ve always wanted to write my autobiography but never found the time and when 
I did, I discovered I was not sure I wanted to expose my families secrets, sadness, 
failing, and unhappiness.  I finally decided to go ahead but not tell anyone in my 
family.  At first I wrote in a superficial manner – that was five years ago- now, 
I’m able to go more in depth and as I write, I’ve found more compassion for those 
people who shaped my life.” 
*These examples are drawn from Study 2 data. Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    40 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The percentage of participants at each age whose crisis narratives reflected self-
event connections, Study 1. 
Figure 2. The percentage of participants at each age whose narratives reflected self-event 
connections, Study 2.  Age and Autobiographical Reasoning    41 
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1 Age was significantly associated with cognitive performance as indicated by the Wais digit-symbol test 
and a verbal fluency task (see Carstensen et al., 2000), but inclusion of these variables did not change any 
of the results reported above. 
2 The primary purpose of the original study was not to examine age differences, but to explore a variety of 
aspects of memory telling in everyday life in a heterogeneous, non-college student sample. Thus, the age 
distribution in the present study is not ideal. 
3 Pasupathi and Carstensen (2003) reported on emotion ratings as a central variable in a set of studies on 
emotional experience while engaged in memory telling. As reported in Pasupathi & Carstensen, 2003, 
participants of different ages reported events with similar emotional properties initially, although older 
adults reported more positive emotion during retelling. The present study is focused on something different 
– namely, the nature of participants’ memories. The memories themselves were not included in the 
previous work.  
4 We also tested for whether age interacted with self-revealingness or the age of the event, such that age-
differences were moderated by these two features of the events narrated. This was not the case, suggesting 
that age differences were independent of these two features of the events. 